Understanding the Sunni Awakening with Complexity Theory by Zorri, Diane Maye
Publications 
2016 
Understanding the Sunni Awakening with Complexity Theory 
Diane Maye Zorri 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, mayed@erau.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Near and 
Middle Eastern Studies Commons, Other International and Area Studies Commons, and the Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Zorri, D. M. (2016). Understanding the Sunni Awakening with Complexity Theory. Digest of Middle East 
Studies, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12077 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
Understanding the Sunni Realignment in Iraq
with Complexity Theory




Concurrent to the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq between 2006 and 2008, Sunni
tribesmen in the U.S. Marine-controlled western Anbar province of Iraq experienced
an “awakening” movement, which led them to side with U.S. and coalition forces.
The Sunni Awakening demonstrates that individuals will often realign because of
betrayal and opportunities for advancement. It also demonstrates that individual
motives can have macrolevel social consequences. Complexity theory suggests that
political factions will realign based on individual considerations that then develop
into macrolevel movements. Complexity theory also combines both agency (in terms
of microbehaviors) and structure (in terms of initial conditions). An important con-
cept within the complexity literature is the idea of “critical mass.” Theories of self-
organization suggest that individual considerations aggregate to a point of critical
mass to become macrolevel movements. In the case of Iraq, you had individuals who
decided as individuals to align with the Americans, but the macrolevel Awakening
movement did not gain momentum until enough individuals had joined the move-
ment. This pattern suggests that complexity theory can be used as a framework for
understanding how critical mass is achieved in realignment.
Introduction
For macrolevel political reasons, in 2006 and 2007, Iraq’s Sunnis realigned withU.S. forces to battle al Qaeda in Iraq (D. Kuehl, personal communication, May
2, 2014).1 Concurrent to the surge of U.S. forces in the region and the U.S. mili-
tary’s doctrinal change in late 2006, Sunni tribal leaders in the western Anbar prov-
ince of Iraq experienced a Sahwa or “Awakening” movement, which led them to
side with U.S. and coalition forces. Later, as more leaders joined the movement,
these “Sons of Iraq” were organized into a formal program and paid by the U.S.
forces to fight insurgent groups.
Explanations of the alliance that formed between U.S. forces and the tribal
sheikhs of Anbar province as well as the broader Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement in
2006 and 2007 are often attributed to monetary factors, or relative economic gains.
Several policymakers have argued that the reason the Sunnis aligned with the United
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Digest of Middle East Studies—Volume 25, Number 1—Pages 132–154
VC 2016 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
States is because we paid them to do so.2 This aligns with the hypothesis that alli-
ances are formed because of individual, agent-level considerations, and political fac-
tions will align when economic gains are assured. To the contrary, the Sunni
Awakening shows that economic considerations are secondary to ideological and
other structural constraints.
From the U.S. perspective, in 2006, the violence in Iraq appeared to be along sec-
tarian lines, and many journalists, policy-makers, and scholars characterized Iraq as
being a state of civil war.3 Radicalized Sunni factions such as al-Qa‘ida in Iraq
(AQI), the Islamic Army, Hamas Iraq, and the 1920s Revolution Brigade were in
open conflict with the Shi‘a militias like the Badr Brigades, Hezbollah Iraq, and the
Mahdi Army (JAM). Likewise, all the militant groups were posing a threat to U.S.
and coalition forces as well as the nascent Iraqi government’s attempts to restore
security and order.
Despite being in a state of civil war, there were also divisions and fractures that
took place within the various religious and ethnic sects. For many Sunnis, the bomb-
ing of the al-Askari Mosque, an ancient Shi‘a holy site in the Iraqi city of Samarra,
in February 2006, was the catalyst for the ideological divide between more
moderate-leaning Sunni insurgents and the radicalized Salafist fighters. After the
bombing of the mosque, retaliatory killings, torture, and kidnappings greatly
increased across the country, and by late 2006, there was an even larger rift between
the Sunni and Shi‘a factions. Many former Ba‘ath party loyalists and military men
also sought to distance themselves from the advances made by Salafist groups like
AQI (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014). According to one for-
mer military officer under Saddam Hussein, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque
not only incited a dramatic increase in sectarian violence, but because it was such an
important national landmark, its destruction dramatically altered the psyche of many
moderate Iraqis (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014). Iraq frac-
tured further along sectarian lines, but also between radicalized elements within each
sect.
The Origins of Sunni Resistance and Modern Iraqi Political Parties
Much of the industrial base created during the early years of the Hussein regime
was destroyed during the Iran-Iraq war, the subsequent Gulf War of 1991 or
through the degenerative effects of socialist-style mismanagement. By the mid-
1990s, the Hussein regime was feeling the compounding effects of heavy borrowing,
U.S.-led economic sanctions, and financial losses from both of the wars. The
Hussein regime did all they could to maintain a strong powerbase among the
Sunnis. This included greater autonomy for loyal tribal sheikhs as well as subsidies
and access to luxury goods (Montgomery, 2009:6). In addition, the regime turned a
blind eye to Sunnis of Anbar province that used tribal connections to create smug-
gling routes for goods that were hard to access under the sanctions. At the same
Spring 2016
Maye 133
time, the heavy sanctions turned many Sunnis against the Ba‘ath Party and toward
religion. To appease the Sunnis, Hussein started a national “Return to Faith” cam-
paign, which turned mosques into centers of social activity and prestige. The result
was a gradual increase in religious fervor and with some, radicalization (Montgomery,
2009:7).
Concurrent to Saddam Hussein’s “Return to Faith” campaign in Iraq, the region
saw an increase in the number of Sunnis that became adherents to a movement
called “Salafism.” The Salafist movement called on Sunnis to adhere to a strict and
literal interpretation of the Qur’an. While not all Salafists promoted violence, many
advocated an Islamic political order and espoused violent means to obtain it
(Mandaville, 2007:248–249). The Salafists were also part of a distinct movement
across the entire Middle East, not just Iraq.
Meanwhile, outside Iraq, opposition grew to the Hussein regime among the Iraqi
Diaspora operating in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries. Most notably
was the effort led by Ahmed Chalabi, a prominent Shi‘a mathematician and banker.
Chalabi led the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a political organization covertly sup-
ported by the U.S. government. The INC’s goal was to bring together anti-Ba‘ath
forces and coordinate their efforts, as well as create the conditions for the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein. In the early 1990s, Ayad Allawi, another wealthy Shi‘a busi-
nessman, created the Iraqi National Accord (INA), which was seen by the U.S. as a
counterbalance to the INC, but with similar intentions.
The only well-organized Sunni opposition to the Ba‘ath Party came from the
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which was established in 1960, the secular Iraqi Commu-
nist Party, and Ayad Allawi’s INA which included secular Sunnis. The IIP was
banned in Iraq and for decades operated out of Great Britain. The IIP had evolved
out of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, and espoused the strict Islam-
ism of the prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar, Sayyid Qutb. The Iraqi Communist
Party had been in operation in Iraq since the 1930s but never gained a large majority
of support in the country. Ayad Allawi’s INA also included many former Ba‘ath
Party members (both Sunni and Shi‘a) that had defected and wanted to effect
regime change.
The Kurds also had political organizations that had been operating for decades;
most notably the secular Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) established in 1975 by
Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) established in 1946 by
Massoud Barzani. Before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Kurdish and Shi‘a
-led opposition parties had grown into legitimate political forces, with decades of
leadership, international sponsorship, and command structure (Table 1).
In 2002, the Bush Administration made the argument that Saddam Hussein was
harboring weapons of mass destruction. Believing an attack by the Hussein regime
was imminent; the Bush Administration launched a preemptive strike on the country
the following spring (Rumsfeld, 2011:433–434).4 After Iraq’s Ba‘athist regime fell,
coalition forces were not ordered to contain the violence that followed the air
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campaign. This proved to be a critical error in decision-making. The impact of the
looting and lawlessness compounded the already dilapidated state of Iraq’s infrastruc-
ture, making difficult to provide basic services. The looting made it nearly impossible
for the coalition forces to operate under the plans they had devised for the post-war
occupation and recovery.
Post-Ba‘athist Government
INC Chairman Ahmed Chalabi and INA Chairman Ayad Allawi both ended up
playing a prominent role in post-Ba‘athist Iraq. In the years leading up to the U.S.
invasion, the State Department paid several million dollars to the INC, and in turn,
Chalabi provided intelligence and the promise of democratic post-Ba‘athist gover-
nance. Likewise, after the Gulf War of 1991, the United States and several other
countries supported Allawi’s INA and his attempts to overthrow Hussein’s
government.
The first post-Ba’athist organization to lead Iraq was the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which had been created in the United
States before the invasion. The commander of ORHA, Army Lieutenant General
Jay Garner, refused to implement the strict de-Ba‘athification being requested by
policymakers in Washington. The organization quickly transformed into the Coali-
tion Provincial Authority (CPA), a transitional governmental organization led by
American policymaker L. Paul Bremer. The CPA took over in May 2003, and was
Table 1: Major Iraqi political parties, Pre-2003a
Saddam-Era Iraqi





Iraqi Isamic Party (IIP) Sunni Religious Iyad al-Samara’i 1960
Iraqi Socialist Ba’ath Party Sunni Socialist Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri 1968
Iraqi National Accord (INA) Shi‘ia/Sunni Secular Ayad Allawi 1991
Islamic Dawa Party Shi‘ia Religious Al-Qamousee 1957 Iran
lslamic Supreme Council of
Iraqi (ISCI)
Shi‘ia Religious Baqir al-Hakim 1982 Iran
Iraqi National Congress
(INC)
Shi‘ia Secular Ahmed Chalabi 1992 U.S.
Kurdistan Democratic
Party(KDP)
Kurdish Secular Massoud Barzani 1946
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK)
Kurdish Secular Jalal Talabani 1975
Kurdistan Islamic Union Kurdish Religious Salaheddine Bahaaeddin 1994
Assyrian Democratic
Movement
Christian Regional Yonacam Kanna 1979
aData for this table was compiled from a variety of sources, see Dawisha (2009), pp. 144, 191, 200, 249–
252; Roston, (2008), pp. 12, 89–92, 153, 161, 322–324. All other tables and figures, with the exception of
Table 1, are syntheses of the authors’ research.
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administratively in charge of Iraq’s governance until June 2004. Under the CPA, an
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) which consisted of various Iraqi political leaders,
provided advice and political leadership until the country regained sovereignty. Many
of the IGC’s members had been working with U.S. officials in Washington before
the invasion, and they were appointed to represent a cross-section of Iraqi society.
The council consisted of men, women, Shi‘a, Kurdish, and Sunni leaders as well
as several political minorities. Likewise, the IGC consisted of the leaders from sev-
eral existing Iraqi political parties including: the KDP, PUK, Kurdistan Islamic
Union, IIP, National Democratic Party, Islamic Da‘wa Party, Iraqi Hezbollah, INC,
the Iraqi Communist Party, INA, the Supreme Council on Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, as well as various independent politicians.
In a move that has been widely criticized by academics and policy-makers,
Bremer’s first order as the CPA administrator was to implement the de-
Ba‘athification of the internal security police and military forces.5 Because the Ba‘ath
Party had been so fully integrated into all the facets of Iraqi security and society, this
move only served to exacerbate the widespread lawlessness. Putting an Iraqi leader at
the forefront of the transitional government did little to help the situation as many
of the IGC’s members had lived in exile for several decades, and were not seen as
legitimate political actors by the Iraqi society, nor did they have the cooperation of
the police or militant factions (D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, May 14,
2014). Once de-Ba‘athification took full effect, the U.S. and coalition forces were
unable to control the highly agitated Iraqi population. The security void was quickly
filled by Shi‘a militias, Sunni insurgents, and radicalized Islamist groups like al-
Qaeda Iraq.
In June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government took over from the CPA under the
lead of the INA Chairman, Ayad Allawi. Ayad Allawi had been in charge of IGC
and was chosen by the council to be the interim Prime Minister until democratic
elections could be held. In May 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Government took over
from the Iraqi Interim Government until the first permanent government took over
in 2006. The CPA and subsequent transitional governments established the frame-
work for a parliamentary republic in Iraq, with executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Iraq’s constitution outlined executive control over a Council of Ministers
and the President; legislative control over Representatives and a Federation Council;
as well as judicial control over courts and prosecution. Under Iraq’s parliamentary
system, the head of government is the Prime Minister, elected by a two-thirds
majority of parliament.
In 2005, Iraq’s first democratic elections were held. The elections used a closed-
list parliamentary system, whereby voters can only vote for political parties, and the
party then controls a proportion of seats in the parliament. Under Iraq’s transitional
law, a 275-member National Assembly was created to act as Iraq’s parliament. Due
to their political marginalization after the U.S. invasion, Arab Sunnis were encour-
aged to boycott the vote by the prominent leader of the Zoba tribe and Chairman of
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the Association of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Harith Sulayman al-Dhari (D. Abdul
Karim, personal communication, May 14 2014). The majority Sunni Anbar province
saw as little as 2% of eligible voters show up to the polls, and across the country
disgruntled Sunnis voiced their opposition to the political situation by rejecting the
legitimacy of the electoral process (Herring & Rangwala, 2005:36) (Table 2).
The absence of Sunnis from the voting resulted in an overwhelming victory for the
predominately Shi‘a blocs, and the Shi‘a parties won nearly half of the votes in the
country. Three major political blocs dominated the 2005 elections: the Shi‘a United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (DPAK), and
Ayad Allawi’s secular Iraqi List. The UIA won a majority in the Shi‘a south, the
DPAK won a majority in the Kurdish north, and the Iraqi List won in the Sunni west.
It is important to note that within Iraq, political parties and militant groups are
often intertwined. Because Iraq’s security situation is so dire, most individuals
Table 2: Iraq - 2005 Elections
ELECTIONS BY YEAR - 2005




Talabani, Barzani Kurd Secular 2,175,511 25.7 75
Islamic Group of
Kurdistan
Abd-Al Aziz Kurd Religious 60,592 0.7 2
Total major Kurdish Parties 2,236,103 26.4 77
United Iraqi Alliance Hakim, Jaafari,
Chalabi,
Shahristani




al Tamah Sh‘ia Religious 43,205 0.5 2
National Independent
Cadres & Elites
al-Sheikh Shl‘la Religious 69,938 0.8 3
Total Major Shi‘ia Parties 4,188,435 49.5 145
Iraqi List Allawi Sunni/Sh‘ia Secular 1,168,943 13.8 40
People’s Union Mousa Sunni/Sh‘ia Secular 69,920 0.8 5
National Democratic
Alliance
al-Chaderchi Sunni/Sh‘ia Secular 36,795 0.4 1
The Iraqis (Iraquion) al-Yawer Sunni Secular 150,680 1.8 5
Reconciliation and
Liberation Bloc
al-Juburi Sunni Secular 30,796 0.4 1
Total Major Sunni/Secular Parties 1,457,134 40 52
Iraqi Turkomen
Front
Abdurrahman Minority Secular 93,480 1.1 3
National Rafidain
List
Kana Minority Secular 36,255 0.4 1
Other 444,819 5.3 –
Total Minorities/Others 574,554 6.8 4
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seeking power are forced to have two faces: one political and one that is militant
(S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014). This complex interplay
between politicians and militant groups is readily apparent when assessing Iraqi poli-
tics over the past decade. Most Shi‘a political parties are associated with a major mil-
itant group, and it is oftentimes difficult to separate the two (Table 3).
It is also important to note that the Sunni and Kurdish militant groups are per-
ceived by the Iraqi government as much more of a threat than the Shi‘a militant
groups, which are often portrayed as militias that keep the peace (D. Abdul Karim,
personal communication, May 14, 2014). Because the SOI was perceived to be
“legitimate” by the U.S. forces in Iraq, and marginally supported by some senior pol-
iticians in Baghdad, it may have only exacerbated the fear that the SOI would even-
tually become a threat to the Shi‘a-dominated government in Baghdad. Likewise,
organized Sunni militants could have been a major threat to only other major Sunni
militant group, the Islamic Army, which was led by Tariq al-Hashemi. In the eyes
of many Iraqi politicians, a popular, legitimate armed group, like the SOI, could
have easily become a powerful political party. And, their fears were not unfounded;
in the wake of their military successes, Abu Abed and his followers began a secular
political party named al-Hal (The Solution), but it was quickly overtaken by
entrenched Sunni politicians (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014;
D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, May 14, 2014) (Fig. 1).
On the political front, the central issue for Iraq’s Arab Sunni population was the
marginalization they got after the fall of Saddam Hussein, which led to their boycott
of the 2005 elections. With the exception of Ayad Allawi’s INA, the Iraqi Commu-
nist Party, and the IIP, most of the Sunni parties were created after the U.S. inva-
sion, and did not have the institutional depth or historical legacy that Kurdish and
Shi‘a parties had built over the past several decades. In addition, de-Ba’athifcation
laws severely hampered their ability to put their strongest leaders at the forefront of
politics. This left secular-leaning Arab Sunnis at a great political disadvantage. In
2005, the major Shi‘a bloc, the UIA received 48.2% of the Iraqi vote. The Kurdish
Table 3: Iraqi Militant Groups and their associated Political PartySect
Militant Group Political Party
Kurdish Kurdish Islamic Movement Islamic Movement of Kurdistan
Sunni Islamic Army Iraq Iraqi Isamic Party (IIP)
Sunni Daesh Islamic State
Shi‘a Badr Bridages Supreme Council on Isiamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Shi‘a Iraqi Suprerme Council on Islam Supreme Council on Isiamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Shi‘a Asa’ib ahl al-Haqq Islamic Dawa Party
Shi‘a Mahdi Army Sadrist Trend
Shi‘a Ka’taib Hezbollah Iraqi Hezbollah
Shi‘a Promised Day Brigades Sadrist Trend
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bloc received 25.7%, while the more secular bloc led by Allawi only received 13.8%
of the vote.
The graphic below depicts how in the 2005 elections Iraqi political parties tended
to form coalitions on two axes. The first axis is a spectrum of religiosity in politics.
On the far left you have parties like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the
Sadrists, who want to fully integrate Shi‘a Islam into political life. On the opposite
end of the spectrum are more secular-leaning parties and the communist parties.
The religious-leaning Shi‘a political parties and the more moderate Shi‘a parties
tended to align together. Likewise, the more secular Kurdish and Sunni parties
tended to form alliances. Within the Kurdish parties, there was a split between secu-
lar Kurds and pro-Islamist Kurds, but a significant majority of Kurds aligned with
the secular DPAK (Fig. 2).
The second axis is a spectrum of ethnicities, where Kurds and Arabs are split.
The Kurds habitually form coalitions together, whereas Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi‘a
split on sectarian lines. The Kurds and Arabs did not form coalitions together, nor
did Sunni and Shi‘a Arabs. The one exception was Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi List, which
included a diverse group of Sunni, Shi‘a, and minority political parties.
During this period, disgruntled insurgent groups and former Ba‘athists gained
more ground and became increasingly effective at targeting coalition forces. The
Figure 1: Major Iraqi militant groups 2000–2006.
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radical Islamist, Abu Musa‘b al-Zarqawi is credited with integrating Salafist ideology
into a cohesive fighting force to counter the American and coalition presence. In
2004, his network pledged allegiance to the broader al-Qaeda terrorist organization,
and was known as AQI.
As such, by 2006, American policy makers feared that if U.S. forces pulled out of
the region too soon, the nascent Iraqi government would be faced with overwhelm-
ing opposition from the insurgency and an ethnic civil war (Ottaway, 2005). To
counter AQI and radicalized elements of the Iraqi society, U.S. and coalition forces
stayed in the country much longer than initially expected. The conundrum for Iraq
was that in order for the nation to gain security, Iraqi-led forces had to generate
enough control of their own territory, but without U.S. and coalition forces in the
region the nation would have quickly spiraled into civil chaos.
To counter the massive insurgency ongoing in Iraq, in 2006 U.S. policy makers
deployed a “surge” of U.S. military forces to the region. Nearly simultaneously, the
U.S. Army published Field Manual 3-24, which revised the doctrine on how to
counter insurgencies. The new doctrine advocated “population-centric” tactics and
the use of small maneuver units. Field commanders were also encouraged to engage
the civilian population by leaving forward operating bases and dispersing forces
throughout urban centers and villages.
Figure 2: Spectrum of Iraqi political parties — 2005.
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The surge proved to be successful in the short run, yet it is difficult to distinguish
which surge component — the military reinforcement or the doctrinal change —
was most effective in Iraq, primarily because there was such little variation in force
employment during this period (Biddle, Friedman, & Shapiro, 2012:39). Military
historian Biddle et al. (2012), carefully noted that, “the modest scale of reinforce-
ments in 2007 suggests that doctrine may actually have been the decisive factor.
Without observing independent variation in troop density and doctrine, however, it
is impossible to make a definitive statement as to their relative causal impact”
(p. 39). Yet, a third factor, a massive Sunni political and military realignment,
proved to be another important (and often overlooked) component in the success of
the surge.
Sunni Political and Military Realignment
The Sunni Awakening movement was actually connected to a much larger move-
ment within Iraq at the time, which was fed by the Sunnis’ widespread discontent of
the central government as well as the rise in al-Qaeda’s criminal activities in their
neighborhoods and villages. The central government could not keep pace with the
spread of the criminal organizations and by late 2005, al-Qaeda had complete con-
trol over many Sunni areas, especially in west Baghdad and the western provinces of
Salahuddin, Tamim, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar.
The Sahwa developed along three distinct levels of Iraqi society. At the elite level
in the society, Sunni politicians stood by the formation of Sunni police forces and
local groups to counter terrorist activity. At the tribal level, leaders joined the move-
ment and served as an example for others. Tribal leaders also encouraged young men
to join the Sahwa. Finally, at the local level, former military officers and Ba’ath Party
loyalists were brought into the fight. At all levels, religious leaders played an impor-
tant role in supporting the alignment (Fig. 3).
Case 1: Tribal Leaders
In the beginning, the Sunni political and military realignment was largely tribal.
From the onset, Sunni tribal leaders viewed the Shi‘a-led Iraqi government with dis-
trust (Rubin & Farrell, 2007), and by 2005, Anbar’s tribal leaders had been endur-
ing years of social, religious, and economic conflict with AQI. AQI leaders posed a
direct threat to the traditional power of the sheikhs and openly challenged their rul-
ings in religious and social matters (Cigar, 2011). Sheikh Ali Hatim al-Suleiman, of
the 3 million strong al-Dulaymi confederation, wanted to strike back at AQI in
2005, but realized that such an effort would provoke an even stronger retaliatory
response. He also realized that the tribal leaders needed American support to be
effective, but openly cooperating with the Americans would not garner popular sup-
port with the general Sunni population (Cigar, 2011). By mid to late 2005 their
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tribes were already in open warfare against al-Qaeda, but they did not have support
from the U.S. forces in the area (Montgomery, 2009:12).
In Anbar Province, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Rishawi is often credited as the
founder of the Anbar Sahwa movement. Like al-Suleiman, Abu Rishawi was
another prominent sheikh from the al-Dulaymi tribe. For most of his life he had
lived as an opportunist. This was compounded during the strict economic sanctions
imposed by the United States after the Gulf War. He was well known for smuggling
oil and conducting highway robberies along the vast stretch of desert highway that
separates Iraq from Syria (D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, May 14,
2014). In 2006, he approached U.S. Marine forces operating in Anbar Province to
build an alliance to fight AQI. His move could not have been more appropriately
timed; the commander there, Lieutenant Colonel Sean MacFarland was facing a
rapidly deteriorating security situation. Earlier that year, the U.S. Marine’s
headquarters-level intelligence staff had concluded that, “there was little the U.S.
could do to stifle the insurgency in Anbar” (Gordon & Trainor, 2012:248). Extraor-
dinary measures would be needed to secure the area.
Abu Rishawi was the first tribal leader to encourage his followers to join the local
police forces in Anbar Province to fight against the insurgency. Other tribal leaders
followed suit, and the Sahwa spread throughout the province. Later, U.S. forces dis-
covered that the killing of his three brothers and his father by AQI had motivated
Abu Rishawi to switch sides (Gordon & Trainor, 2012:251). As his movement
grew, he founded a formal council for Sahwa matters, which included dozens of
Sunni tribal leaders from his region. The collaborative pattern “spread rapidly thor-
ough the province” (Wilbanks & Karsh, 2010:59), and thousands of young Sunni
men joined the local police forces.
The Anbar Awakening was particularly successful because the Sunnis knew
exactly were the AQI fighters lived and how to target them (D. Abdul Karim,
Figure 3: Sahwa — levels of Iraqi society.
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personal communication, May 14, 2014). The legitimacy of Anbar’s tribal leaders
was instrumental in the recruitment and retention of young Sunni men. Because it
was so successful, the Anbar Awakening became the model for exploiting the fissure
between Sunni insurgent groups and the general Sunni population (Office of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011). The integration and focus
on tribal leaders was also key, because they ended up providing the critical link
between Sunni politicians in Baghdad and former military officers working at the
local level.
Case 2: Former Military Officers
When then the commander of the U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regi-
ment, then-Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, arrived in western Baghdad in late
2006, he recalled there was no rule of law, no municipal services, and violence was
very high. (D. Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014). Over the next several
months, the violence did not abate. By May 2007, a succession of improvised explo-
sive device attacks over the course of two weeks killed over a dozen of Colonel
Kuehl’s soldiers. As Colonel MacFarland had done in Anbar Province, Colonel
Kuehl took extraordinary measures to redirect the momentum of the campaign.
One of the first leaders of the Awakening movement in Baghdad, Sa‘ad
Ghaffoori (aka Abu Abed), had worked as an Iraqi Army intelligence officer under
Saddam Hussein. By late 2006, AQI was controlling the population in his upper
class neighborhood of Ameriyah in western Baghdad through kidnapping, torture,
and murder (Kuehl, 2009:77). Tactically speaking, Ameriyah was in an ideal position
to hit Radwaniyah Palace Complex, the biggest coalition base in Iraq, with Katyu-
shas and other Soviet-era artillery pieces stolen by AQI fighters. After the fall of
Saddam Hussein, AQI fighters had vowed to protect Ameriyah’s residents from
Shi‘a militias and American soldiers. Without the rule of law, however, AQI grossly
abused their power and the residents of the neighborhood, which was deemed by
many AQI operatives as the capital of the Islamic State in Iraq. Abu Abed’s own
brothers were tortured and beheaded by Shi‘a militias because of the wayward secu-
rity in the area.
Encouraged by the success of the Anbar Awakening, and with the help of a local
sheikh, in May 2007 Abu Abed took charge of the Sahwa movement in Ameriyah.
Over the course of the next several months, Abu Abed worked with the U.S. mili-
tary to gain control over the neighborhood. The collaboration aided both sides: Abu
Abed’s men gained military support from the U.S. Army; and the U.S. Army gained
critical intelligence which aided in targeting AQI members and finding their weap-
ons caches (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014).
The SOI’s intimate knowledge of the local population, insurgent strongholds, and
access to reliable intelligence, facilitated the efficiency and success of the Sahwa
movement. With the help of U.S. forces and momentum gained from tactical suc-
cesses, the Sahwa quickly spread to Baghdad’s other neighborhoods, including: Hayy
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Al-Jamia, Adhimiya, Dora, and Khadra. By early 2008, the SOI had grown to a
force of over 100,000 (Ahmed, 2008). Many of the SOI leaders were former Iraqi
officers and soldiers under Saddam Hussein (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication,
July 25, 2014). These men were familiar with formal military doctrine as well as
unconventional, small arms, and guerilla tactics. Once the program was formalized
by the United States, the SOI were paid the equivalent of approximately $300 per
month for providing security services (Bruno, 2009).
In the summer of 2007, U.S. Forces were authorized to appropriate funds from a
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) for security projects; like the
SOI, however the initial negotiations took several months. Colonel Kuehl intended
for CERP to pay local militiamen and volunteers a salary for their time spent aiding
coalition forces. During the intense fighting period of May 2007 through August
2007, Abu Abed’s militiamen were not paid, and from the perspective of the U.S.
commander on the ground in Ameriyah, money did not appear to be the motivating
factor behind the realignment (D. Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014).
Three months after the initial collaboration and noteworthy tactical successes, the
U.S. Army signed a security contract with 300 of Abu Abed’s militiamen (Kuehl,
2009:78). However, Colonel Kuehl notes that August 2007 was really the tipping
point for the rapid downturn in violence in Ameriyah. In early August 2007,
Colonel Kuehl and several members of the 1/5 CAV were invited to the wedding
ceremony of Abu Abed’s ranking intelligence officer. During the ceremony, in the
heart of western Baghdad, the officers were comfortable enough with the security sit-
uation to remove their arms, helmets, and flak vests. Between late August 2007 and
January 2008 when 1/5 CAV left Iraq, Colonel Kuehl’s battalion only experienced
small arms fire (D. Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014).
Equally important to gaining security was the ability to restore municipal services
to the people. Colonel Kuehl recounted that reconstruction projects were just as
important in helping the Iraqis regain a sense of normalcy (D. Abdul Karim, perso-
nal communication, May 14, 2014). It is impossible to assess the success of the
surge, without also looking at the simultaneous reconstruction efforts by the U.S.
Army’s Civil Affairs units, the U.S. Army’s Corps of Engineers, and the State
Department’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars
were spent on CERP projects, which went directly toward civil capacity building.
General Petraeus himself outlines the importance of civil capacity building in Army
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency:
Most valuable to long-term success in winning the support of the populace
are the contributions land forces make by conducting stability operations.
Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordi-
nation with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a
safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services,
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emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Forces
engaged in stability operations establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil serv-
ices. They act directly but also support government agencies. Success in sta-
bility operations enables the local populace and HN [host nation]
government agencies to resume or develop the capabilities needed to conduct
COIN operations and create conditions that permit U.S. military forces to
disengage. (Nagl, Amos, Sewall, & Petraeus, 2008, sections 2–22)
Case 3: Sunni Politicians
Back to the elite level of the Iraqi society, once the SOI movement gained initial
successes, Sunni political leaders stood by the formation of Sahwa forces. They also
took steps to encourage the U.S. military to accept their legitimacy. This was an
important political move, and it was one that did not last for the entire duration of
the program.
One example of the political support by ranking Sunni politicians was when they
advocated for the SOI in Abu Ghraib. By late 2006, the Awakening was spreading
throughout Anbar province. Abu Azzam al Tamimi, an Islamic Army commander
from Abu Ghraib, approached the U.S. Army battalion stationed there, with offers
to help control the area. At the time, the Sunni militants in Abu Ghraib, situated
on the outskirts of west Baghdad in Anbar Province, were being squeezed on two
fronts. On one front, AQI was terrorizing the area. On the other, the Iraqi Army
6th Division’s famed Muthanna Brigade, which was charged with protecting the
area, was actually exploiting the sectarian strife (Gordon & Trainor, 2012:385). The
commander of the Muthanna Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nassir al-Hiti was one of
Prime Minister Maliki’s favorite Army officers, and was sent at Maliki’s behest to
keep the peace (Robinson, 2009:260; S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25,
2014; D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, May 14, 2014). Instead, there was
major tension between the SOI and the Muthanna Brigade, and each side suspected
the other had a sectarian agenda (Gordon & Trainor, 2012: 385).
In early 2007, three senior Sunni politicians: Tariq al-Hashimi, Mahmoud al-
Mashhadani, and Adnan Dulami met with coalition military leaders to convince
them that arming local Sunni forces in Abu Ghraib would not be a threat to the
standing government in Baghdad (Gordon & Trainor, 2012:386). Their support of
the movement was critical in getting broader acceptance of the SOI. The support of
many Sunni politicians was short-lived, however. In late 2007, Iraqi Vice President
Tariq al-Hashimi came to ‘Ameriya in Baghdad to check on the security situation,
and SOI soldiers holding the area fired upon his convoy. Some SOI soldiers per-
ceived him as trying to take credit for their hard-earned successes and promote his
own political agenda, with his IIP (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25,
2014). The Sunni politician perceived the SOI to be a political and a security threat
(S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014; D. Abdul Karim, personal
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communication, May 14, 2014). This sentiment grew over time, and by early 2008
there was widespread concern amongst both Sunni and Shi‘a politicians that the
SOI program was out of control (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25,
2014; D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, May 14, 2014).
Post-Stability
The Awakening movement allowed the U.S. to take advantage of the internal clea-
vages amongst Sunni forces, seize the momentum, and provide stability. The combi-
nation the surge in U.S. forces, Army doctrinal changes and the Sunni Awakening
led to a decrease in violence and a strategic pause which enabled the U.S. forces to
negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqis and develop a plan to with-
draw from the region. In addition, the decrease in violence led to a gradual improve-
ment in the ability of the Iraq Army to control and hold ground during operations.
The successes allowed coalition forces to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and focus on capacity building (H. Ahmed, personal commu-
nication, July 15, 2008).6
Once a modicum of stability was achieved, the Americans planned to integrate
the SOI into the newly organized ISF and the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) (Wilbanks
& Karsh, 2010:65–67). At the time of the handover of the SOI program from the
United States to the Iraqi government in 2009, the movement “could boast 118,000
personnel, grouped in over 130 Sahwa councils (Cigar, 2011:56). The Shi‘a-led gov-
ernment in Baghdad was not enthusiastic about the SOI, and neither were many
Sunni politicians who saw the program disorganized and a threat to security (A.
Dulaymi, personal communication, September 3, 2014).7 Shi‘a and Sunni politicians
were both wary of the disparate groups and feared that the SOI’s power could grow
into a movement that would threaten their power base (A. Dulaymi, personal com-
munication, September 3, 2014).
In October 2008, the United States began to transition the SOI program to the
Government of Iraq (GOI). To facilitate the transparency of the program, coalition
forces had agreed to hand over a biometric database they had created of all the SOI
participants. The transition of the SOI program to the GOI was marked with
uncertainty and concern, as well as funding issues (D. al Dherzi, personal communi-
cation, July 28, 2008).8 The GOI was reluctant to make significant political conces-
sions to the Sunnis because they saw their organization as a threat to GOI’s
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Many of the SOI had also been a part of
Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘ath Party and police forces. The Sunni political leadership and
tribal sheikhs suspected that the GOI would use information about the SOI to
make arrests and leverage their power. Although there was doubt that the program
would transition well, over the next few years many of the SOI were integrated into
the ISF or IPS, or were given civilian jobs (Katzman, 2015). Unfortunately, many
SOI were also killed or were forced to leave the country. Some Awakening leaders
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have been involved in politics at the provincial and national level since the drawdown
of coalition forces in the region, but most have been forced to leave the political
arena (Katzman, 2015).
Analysis
On the one hand, the Sahwa was about gaining power and putting the Sunnis back
into the political fold; on the other it is hard to imagine the Sahwa forming without
the more moderate-leaning Sunni’s motivation to balance the threat from the Salafist
AQI (D. Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014). Many of the leading schol-
ars and practitioners of the U.S. Army’s doctrine on counterinsurgency have argued
that counterinsurgency takes place at the small unit level. Although initially, U.S.
forces were not ideally postured to fight the insurgency in Iraq, the SOI had the
autonomy to execute the small unit tactics that were successful against the insurgents
in their neighborhoods. In essence, it was the SOI that reflected the counterinsur-
gency doctrine of population-centric, rapidly adapting, tactical-level resistance. The
Sunni realignment also demonstrates that the impetus to “change sides” often hap-
pens on a personal level before it grows into an ideological movement. Likewise, the
Sunni Awakening shows that realignment is often initialized because of betrayal and
opportunities for advancement, and not necessarily by monetary gain. As the Awak-
ening movements grew, it became a way for former military members and jobless
men to find meaningful employment (R. Chakmachi, personal communication,
August 11, 2014). So, while the initial recruitment was ideologically driven, over
time it became a security business (R. Chakmachi, personal communication, August
11, 2014).
There is disagreement on whether or not a single personality can shape an entire
movement. Colonel Simon Gardiner, an Army Civil Affairs Officer that served in
Iraq during the surge, points to the importance of personal leadership in countering
insurgency (Simon Gardiner, personal communication, May 11, 2014). Equally
important during the Sahwa was the role of a leading figure, like Abu Rishawi or
Abu Abed, who had charisma and leadership capabilities, as well as the ability to
convince others to “switch sides.”
Conversely, Major General John Kelly, who was the Multi-National Force-West
commander during the height of the surge, states that “[n]o singe personality was
the key in Anbar. . . [i]t was a combination of factors, not the least of which. . .was
the consistent command philosophy” (Kelly, 2009:vii). It is important to understand
that under previous regime in Iraq there was a cult of personality that promoted the
adulation of Saddam Hussein. Likewise, Arab politics is often dominated by a lead-
ing figure, which is common in authoritarian governance (Sassoon, 2011:175).
The social scientist, Max Weber (1968), stressed the importance of charismatic
leadership in his analysis of power and legitimate authority (p. 215). The importance
of charismatic leadership as a source of legitimate authority was seen during the
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Sunni Awakening, but perhaps underappreciated by coalition forces, who were more
accustomed to legal-rational and traditional sources of authority. The rise of Abu
Abed as a charismatic leader is especially important, as his power rested on his abil-
ity to perform heroic deeds, often by irrational or untraditional means. Yet, through-
out the Middle East and in Islamic culture, the charismatic leader is seen quite often
in both politics and religion. Going all the way back to the seventh century AD, the
Islamic Prophet Muhammad is regarded as a highly charismatic leader. During the
twentieth century, the region saw a succession of political leaders who were typically
deemed to be a source of legitimate authority after a coup d’etat. Yassir Arafat, Gamal
Abdul Nasser, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Ayatollah Khomeni, and even Saddam
Hussein were all viewed as charismatic leaders (Fig. 4).
The figure above shows how realignment occurred in the case of Abu Rishawi
and Abu Abed. First, the individuals had a grievance. In the case of Abu Rishawi,
it was AQI’s lack of respect for tribal authority and the fact they killed his family
members. In the case of Abu Abed, it was AQI’s indiscriminate use of violence
and the lack of security in his neighborhood. Both men sensed an opportunity for
advancement, both in terms of security for their area and in political opportunity
(S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, July 25, 2014). Over time, this led to
their individual realignment with U.S. forces. The next steps in the realignment
process were significant battlefield successes against AQI, which then led to their
rise as a popular figure. Only then did the realignment happen on a macrolevel,
across a sector of the society. It is important to note that within that sector of
society, many have the same grievances as the popular figure. Once a macrolevel
alignment took place, U.S. forces were able to institutionalize the program. It is
important to note that the bulk of the realignment process is ideological. Most of
the steps involved are not economic in nature. Only when an ideological shift
happened, buffered by an opportunity for economic and political security, did
realignment take place.
Figure 4: Phases of realignment: ideological versus economic.
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Realignment in the case of the Sunni Awakening, was typically brought on by
personal grievances and an opportunity to gain security. The issue for host nation
and coalition forces is that in order for the realigned factions to aid in counterinsur-
gency, they must be able to self-organize and protect themselves, as well as their
communities. The realigned factions also had a leading figure, which convinced
others to join the cause. The problem is that self-organization by militant groups,
especially those with a leading figure, are perceived as a threat to the state and
entrenched politicians. Ironically, the Sunni Awakening movement had the effect of
securing the Shi‘a-led government in Baghdad, but its leaders were later abandoned,
targeted, and forced into political exile.
The Complexity Dimension
Rooted in the study of nonlinear dynamics, complexity theory in the social scien-
ces looks at how microsystems and events can cause complex behaviors at the
macrolevel. Complexity theories take into account both agency and structure as well
as a multitude of variables contributing to initial conditions, many of which do not
act in a linear fashion. The theorists postulate that these layers of interactions
produce self-reinforcing feedback loops, many of which depend on strong prior con-
ditions. Complexity theory is characterized by nine basic concepts: survivability,
co-evolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-organized crit-
icality, punctuated equilibrium, and fitness landscapes (Axelrod 1997; Axelrod, Axel-
rod, & Cohen, 2000; Kauffman, 1993, 2000; Lewin 1999; Regine & Lewin, 2000;
Richards, 2000).
Thomas Schelling’s 1978 work, Micromotives and Macrobehaviors assesses the
aggregation of individual micromotives as an expression of societal macrobehavior.
One of the key models that Schelling uses is in the notion of “critical mass,” which
is the point where a sufficient number of individuals adopt a change in a social sys-
tem so that change becomes self-sustaining. Schelling also introduces the concept of
feedback loops applied to social behavior.
The complexity literature in the social sciences is a departure from neorealism on
three major fronts. First, nonstate actors are important when looking at the evolution
of the international system (Jervis, 1998). Complexity models are important in the
analysis of substate alignments and alliances because there is a propensity for multi-
ple layers of belligerents and actors (Jervis, 1998). Second, equilibrium is not as
meaningful a concept, like it is in realism. Whereas in the realist literature, the con-
cepts of balancing and “bandwagoning” to restore the balance of power are key strat-
egies for state survival; the literature on complexity theories looks at evolutions,
dynamic systems, and patterns of change. Third, the complexity literature takes into
account both agency (in terms of micromotives) and structure (in terms of initial
conditions).
Using the hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature on alliance formation
reveals several key insights for both the Sunni Awakening and the formation of
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coalitions across the spectrum of Iraqi politics. The hypotheses from the complexity
and sociology literature also play a part in the Sunni Awakening as well, as we see
that political factions are more likely align when a point of critical mass is achieved.
This is very well demonstrated in the case of the “macro” level realignment that
gained momentum after significant battlefield victories. The point of critical mass is
hard to pinpoint, but in each case the movements experienced exponential growth to
the point of a macrolevel realignment. Likewise, the movement was driven by charis-
matic leaders who used their personality as a form of power, demonstrating the
Weberian (Weber, 1968) concept of charismatic authority (Fig. 5).
Because no one single theory from the academic literature above fully explains
how alliances occur, this work proposes a new theory on how to address the question
of why the Sunnis realigned against AQI. This theory suggests that in order for
realignment to occur, instead of looking at alliance formation through the lens of
behavioral science, political science, or sociology alone, alignment needs to be seen as
a multistage process, where both structure (in terms of initial conditions) and agency
(in terms of leadership) play complimentary roles. Therefore, in the case of the
Sunni Awakening shows us that competing politico-military factions formed alliances
with the U.S. based on agent-level and structural-level constraints. To balance
against the threat of AQI, the Sunnis joined the side of the United States, which
supports the neorealist hypothesis. From the behavioral science literature, we see that
ideological differences and grievances played a large role at the individual-level and
at the onset of the realignment. Finally, the complexity literature is supported
because at the point of critical mass, the movement went from a microlevel to
macrolevel.
The relationship between realignment and the occupying force’s policies in facili-
tating realignment is also important. In the aforementioned cases, the United States
Did not approach Abu Rishawi or Abu Abed with the notion of realignment or
switching sides. To the contrary, the U.S. military’s role was to gain them success on
the battlefield, which in turn gave them more legitimacy and popular support. So,
Figure 5: Phases of realignment and corresponding theoretical framework.
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the critical point in realignment for the U.S. military is really the point between the
individual’s realignment and the battlefield successes.
In the case of the Sunni Awakening, the realignment could also be viewed as a
social movement. This particular social movement was a result of the cleavage
between politically moderate Sunnis and the radicalized Salafist factions that sup-
ported AQI. The catalyst and success of this particular social movement can be
linked to the charismatic leadership of both Abu Rishawi, who initiated the tribal
realignment and with Abu Abed, who initiated the Awakening in Baghdad.
Conclusion: Complexity Matters
There are several theories that come to play at different stages in the realignment
process. The hypotheses from behavioral science and political science are important,
but the hypotheses derived from the complexity literature also play an important role
in understanding macrolevel realignment. At the beginning of the realignment, theo-
ries from behavioral science help explain why individuals initially choose to realign in
the early phases of the process. Once the realignment begins to take place among a
wider body of individuals, the theories from neorealism may be able explain it on a
larger scale, while simultaneously the rise of the popular figure and the points of crit-
ical mass are best explained through complexity theory and sociology. Finally, once
the security business is established, behavioral science once again explains why indi-
viduals will realign. Complexity theory offers a unique insight into the world of alli-
ance formation as well as a frame of mind for understanding the dynamic nature of
realignment in wartime.
Notes
1. The following interviews were conducted for this chapter: Dale Kuehl, interview by author,
Rock Island Arsenal, IL, May 2, 2014; Sa‘ad Ghaffoori, interview by author, Eskilstuna,
Sweden, July 25, 2014; Dhafir Abdul Karim, interview by author, Alexandria, VA, May 14,
2014; Hamid Ahmed, e-mail message to author, July 15, 2008; Ahmed Dulaymi, interview
by author, Fort Lauderdale, FL, September 3, 2014; Dhia al Dherzi, email to author, July
28, 2008; Ray Chakmachi, interview by author, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, August 11, 2014;
Simon Gardiner, interview by author, Charleston, SC, May 11, 2014.
2. See: Public Radio International (2009) “Paying the Taliban to Quit”; Levin (2009). For back-
ground on how the Army uses money as a weapon system see: Center for Army Lessons
Learned (2009, April); Petraeus (2008, September–October).
3. For examples see: Burns (2005); Pace (2005).
4. In an August 2002, briefing by the Deputy CIA Director, Iraq was believed to have reconsti-
tuted facilities for biological and chemical weapons and retained a significant nuclear
capacity. The CIA believed Iraq had continued WMD programs, maintained missiles, and
acquired fissile material from abroad.
5. See: Coalition Provincial Authority (2003, 16 May); Coalition Provincial Authority (2003, 23
May). Also: Ottaway (2005); Sissons & al-Saiedi (2013, March); Terrill (2012, May).
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6. Dr. Hamid Ahmed worked for the 10th Mountain Division at Iskandaria to establish training
bases.
7. Ahmed Dulaymi was elected as the governor of Anbar province in 2013.
8. Dhia al Dherzi worked for the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), in the Iraqi
Ministry of the Interior (MOI) Finance section.
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